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COURT OF APPEALS, 1961 TERM
child is to be brought here and adopted, then the prospective foster parents must
show that they have obeyed the pre-adoption requirements of the state, if
such requirements exist, of the child's proposed residence.6 Possible constitu-
tional issues are thus apparently avoided by a combination of state and federal
legislation.
W. W. M., Jr.
CONFESSION DURING PERIOD OF ILLEGAL DETENTION ADMISSIBLE IF VOLUNTARY
Defendants were arrested for illegal possession of firearms and were com-
mitted to the county jail by a formal written order of a city court judge,
pending proceedings on the following day, which was Monday. Three hours
after the commitment order, the defendants were removed from the county
jail by police officers and were taken to a police station for questioning. During
the interrogation, which lasted for ten to twelve hours, the defendants made
inculpatory statements in connection with a felony murder for which they
were subsequently indicted. At the trial the statements were admitted into
evidence despite the fact that the trial court ruled as a matter of law that they
were made during a period of illegal detention. The detention was illegal
because of the unauthorized removal from the county jail, and the unreasonable
delay in arraignment. The defendants were convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to death. On reargument of appeals from these convictions, held,
reversed, two judges dissenting, and new trials ordered. No error was committed
in submitting to the jury the voluntary nature of the statements of the defend-
ants, although obtained after an illegal removal from the county jail, and during
an unreasonable delay in arraignment. But, it was reversible error to allow
the district attorney to make comments in his summation on the absence of
police brutality toward one of the suspects. The reason that the comment was
error was that the district attorney had been successful in excluding testimony
at the trial pertaining to the physical treatment afforded this suspect. The
majority concluded that this was prejudicial because it implied that the defend-
ants in the case were not beaten. People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 179 N.E.2d
339, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961).
The New York rule on admissibility of confessions is based on whether or
not the confession was made voluntarily.1 Ordinarily the question of the voluntary
nature of the confession is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.2 But
the law is well settled that when the evidence shows without dispute that the
confession was extorted by force or fear, the judge should reject it as a matter
6. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1155(b) (1961).
1. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395, states that "a confession of a defendant ... can
be given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear produced by
threats. .. ."
2. People v. Elmore, 277 N.Y. 397, 14 N.E.2d 451 (1938) ; People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192,
192 N.E. 289 (1934); People v. Kelly, 264 App. Div. 14, 35 N.Y.S.2d 55 (3d Dep't 1942).
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of law.3 However, in the case at bar the defendants do not base their appeal
solely on the fact that their confessions were involuntary. They contend that
their confessions should be excluded from evidence because they were made
during a period of illegal detention. The Court of Appeals has held that in
certain situations confessions are to be excluded not because they were invol-
untary, but because their use would violate the defendant's fundamental
constitutional rights. Voluntary confessions and statements made in the ab-
sence of counsel after indictment are inadmissible on the ground that the
defendant's constitutional right to counsel and freedom from testimonial com-
pulsion have been violated.
4
In the instant case, the question is whether the statements made by the
defendants, although voluntary, should be excluded because they were elicited
during a period of illegal detention prior to arraignment. It is conceded by the
prosecution that the provisions of the New York prompt arraignment statute5
were violated, but this violation does not in itself make the statements inad-
missible. This has been the rule in New York since 1880, when it was held
that the People are not precluded from the use of a voluntary confession merely
because the officer to whom it was made was exercising an illegal restraint
over the defendant. 6 It is also settled New York law that the fact that a
confession was given during a period of illegal detention is only one factor
to be considered in determining whether or not it was involuntary. 7 But in a
concurring opinion in the instant case, Judge Fuld said he would change the
New York law to conform to the federal rule, as enunciated in the cases of
McNabb v. United Statess and Mallory v. United States,9 to exclude all con-
fessions made during an illegal detention period from being admitted into
evidence. His contention was that this exclusionary rule should be adopted
by New York because judicial integrity demands that the court should not
sanction illegal enforcement of the criminal law. Chief Judge Desmond, in a
dissenting opinion, dismisses the grounds for reversal relied upon by the
majority as not being significant enough to justify reversal. His opinion,
however, is chiefly concerned with replying to Judge Fuld, and is based pri-
marily on the assertion that to exclude a confession merely because it was
obtained during a period of unlawful detention does not take into consideration
3. People v. Valletutti, 297 N.Y. 226, 78 N.E.2d 485 (1948); People v. Barbato 254
N.Y. 170, 172 N.E. 458 (1930); People v. Weiner, 248 N.Y. 118, 161 N.E. 441 (19285.
4. People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961)
said that there is a "constitutional . . . right of a defendant to the assistance of counsel at
every stage of a criminal cause (N.Y. Const., art. I, § 6 . . .)." People v. DiBiasi, 7
N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960) held that statements obtained from
an accused in the absence of counsel, after indictment, which were admitted into evidence
was testimonial compulsion.
5. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 165, provides that upon arrest the defendant "must in
all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay."
6. Balbo v. People, 80 N.Y. 484 (1880).
7. People v. Alex, supra note 2; People v. Mummiani, 258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94
(1932); People v. Trybus, 219 N.Y. 18, 113 N.E. 538 (1916).
8. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
9. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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the voluntary nature of the confession. He concludes that voluntariness is the
only logical test regarding admissibility, as is illustrated by the New York
cases. 10 He also concludes that if a change in the statute regarding confessions
is needed, that change would have to come from the legislature, and not from
court interpretation.
The holding of the instant case seems to fall within the established prin-
ciples regarding admissibility of confessions and adds nothing to the law of
New York. As to Judge Fuld's attempt to adopt the McNabb-Mallory rule,
the United States Supreme Court has stated that the rule is only procedural
and evidentiary and not required by constitutional due process. Therefore, it
is not made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, but is
based solely on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal
courts." Judge Fuld's thesis that an exclusionary rule would be the worthier
rule of law, finds ample support in the telling arguments of Professors Hogan
and Snee in their now-definitive work on the subject, so that they need not
be detailed here.12
In the case of People v. Everett, 10 N.Y.2d 500, 180 N.E.2d 556, 225
N.Y.S.2d 193 (1962) a unanimous court, Judge Fuld deeming himself "con-
cluded by the holding in the Lane case," reaffirmed the principle that confes-
sions are not inadmissible because obtained during a period of unlawful
detention. In the Everett case the defendant argued that his confession should
not have been admitted into evidence, because his arrest failed to comply with
section 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section provides that when
an officer makes an arrest without a warrant and not during the commission of
a crime, "the officer must inform him of the authority of the officer and cause
of the arrest." The defendant claims he was not informed of the cause of the
arrest, therefore, his arrest was unlawful as was the detention that followed.
But the Court does not consider the question of the legality of the arrest or the
detention thereafter, stating that the manner of arrest and subsequent deten-
tion are circumstances which are to be considered by the jury in deciding the
issue of the voluntary nature of the confession. As a collateral argument, the
defendant attempted to have the confession excluded on the ground that it
was fraudulently induced. The Court also rejected this contention, relying on
the well-settled doctrine that "'a confession is admissible, although it is ...
obtained by artifice or deception.' -3
More recently, the Court of Appeals, in the case of People v. Meyer,'
4
extended the exclusionary rule to confessions made in the absence of counsel,
10. Supra note 6.
11. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 599, 601 (1961); Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
12. Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47
Geo. L.J. 1, 21-33 (1958).
13. 10 N.Y.2d at 507, 180 N.E.2d at 559, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 198, quoted from People
v. Wentz, 37 N.Y. 303, 306 (1867).
14. 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962).
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from the post indictment to the post arraignment stage of the criminal pro-
ceedings. The Court held that a voluntary, unsolicited statement made by the
defendant to a police officer, in the absence of counsel, after arraignment fol-
lowing his arrest, was inadmissible. The Court, in Meyer, stated that the
arraignment must be considered the first stage of a criminal proceeding, and
any statement, made thereafter in the absence of counsel, violates the de-
fendant's right to counsel and also infringes upon his privilege against self-
incrimination. In an even more recent case,' 5 the Court stated that interrogation
in the absence of counsel is prohibited after the criminal proceeding had been
commenced. The Court went on to state that it makes no difference if the
criminal proceedings are commenced by a grand jury indictment, or by a
charge placed against the accused by a magistrate after arrest.
In the light of these developments, the question that arises with regard
to the instant case would be-when did the criminal proceedings against the
accused commence? With the benefit of hindsight it would seem likely that if a
case involving the same facts as the instant case were before the Court today,
it would hold that the criminal cause against the defendant had begun. The
defendants had been committed to jail by a court order, and although a formal
arraignment was postponed until the following day, the judicial process had
started in motion. Therefore, it would seem that the statements of the
defendants, obtained during the interrogation following their illegal removal
from jail, would be a violation of their right to counsel and their privilege
against self-incrimination. But this conclusion would only pertain to the facts
of the instant case, that is, where there has been the illegal removal of an
accused from jail, following judicial process. Still the question remains whether
eventually the Court may find it necessary to adopt the exclusionary rule in
the area of illegal detentions. Since constitutional rights now attach at arraign-
ment, it may present a real temptation to law enforcement officials to prolong
further the pre-arraignment period and exaggerate present illegal detentions.
The result is an impingement on these constitutional rights which depend upon
arraignment. The door then is left ajar for the Court to declare through due
process that such impingement requires an exclusionary rule to make effective
the constitutional right to counsel and freedom from testimonial compulsion
already declared to belong to the accused. W. J. L.
CONFESSIONS OBTAINED BY CONFRONTATION WITH ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE
OR AFTER INITIATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT BENEFIT OF
COUNSEL ARE INADMISSIBLE
Prior to arraignment for premeditated murder, defendant was questioned
and made statements implicating himself after being confronted with illegally
obtained evidence. The following day he was brought before a justice of the
15. People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962).
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